Luftwaffe Ln-Dienst in Norway.  
  Luftwaffe HQs in Norway.  

HQs were established as depicted on the map above and their location is detailed here.  The only formal Jafü was Jafü Norwegen at Stavanger-Forus, but Flg.Füh Nord (Ost), Nord (West)/4 and 5.Flg.Div. had day or nightfighters under their command at some stage during the war.  I.e. Jafü Norwegen was not the superior HQ for ALL fighter units in Norway.  The afore mentioned HQs must have exercised operational and tactical control over their subordinate fighter formations.  It is thus odd, not to find a Jafü associated with these HQ.  In DEC 1944 Jafü Norwegen was subordinated to 5.Flg.Div.

  The Wassermann S at FICHTE.  Via Paul Sedal, published with the permission of Fedje Kommune, kulturkontoret.  
  Map of Flugmeldemess Stellungen, Norway and Finland. (5)  

List of Flugmeldemess Stellungen in Norway with equipment.

  (5).  Based on:  
         Hoffmann Band II, Teil 1 p. 85.  
         BAMA RL 9/43 very kindly provided by Olve Dybvig.  
         Luftwaffe LAND UNITS IN FINLAND AND NORTHERN NORWAY 1941 - 1944  

Organization of Ln.- Stellungen in Northern Norway May 1945.


Organization of Ln.- Stellungen in Southern Norway May 1945.

  Conceptually these organizations were very similar to that found in France in 1943 - 1944, but they are not in line with the re-organization implemented in the rest of Das Reich in mid 1944.  Albeit the term Klein FLUKO was not used, it is obvious that a unit with a similar function was attached to each Stellung.  What is even more odd, is that the term FLUKO is not used either, but it is also evident that the Haupt FLUWA performed the same function.  Of special note is the subordination in a few exceptional cases of a FuMG Stellung to a Hpt.FLUWA.  Both charts are based on BAMA RL 9/43.  
  A prerequisite for effective fighter employment is a fully initiated and correctly identified air picture.  The number of Flugmeldemess Stellungen and the deployed FLUWAs ensured a respectable coverage except at low altitude, where continuous tracking is impossible due to terrain masking.  The FLUWAs reported to the Stellungen, which in turn reported  to a Abschnitts Flugmelde Zentrale (AFMZ).  It is thus noteworthy that there were AFMZ close the the GefStd of Jafü Norwegen, Flg.Füh Nord (West)/4, 5.Flg.Div. and Lft. 5, but not to Flg.Füh Nord (Ost).  It is also noteworthy that the Meldekopf of the Funkaufklärungs Dienst also were located adjacent to these HQs.  This supports the theory that the Flg.Füh and Flg.Div:  1. Received the Luftlage and 2. Exercised Operational and tactical control over the fighter units.  These functions require some fairly special GefStds, which I dearly would like help to find.  

What remains is the actual intercept control.  Nightfighters had to be controlled from a Flugmeldemess Stellung or from the GefStd of the HQ performing the JD/Jafü function.  A few Stellungen in Norway were able to perform Himmelbett, but many could perform Seeburg-Lichtenstein Verfahren only.  As far as it can be established, dedicated Jägerleit Stellungen were never deployed in Norway, which leaves Geführte Zahme Sau out of the question.  The last possibility was  Ungeführte Zahme Sau , but this required a comprehensive coverage by navigational aids (Schweres Funk Feuer), and these were few and far between in Norway.  Most of the Stellungen North of the Arctic Circle were unable to perform nightfighter control at all due the the limited radar equipment notably the lack of Würzburg Riese.


Day fighter control was in the rest of Das Reich conducted as Y-Verfahren Jagd (Tag) as elsewhere described.  There were no separate Jägerleit Stellungen in Norway, but both AFMZ Bergen and Gossen were equipped with 2 Y-Linien and the Brummer radio system.  Furthermore DFMZ Stavanger and Drontheim were also Y-Linien equipped.  This strongly indicates, that the AFMZ not alone compiled the Luftlage, but also performed day fighter intercept control It is noteworthy that Hoffmann have some of these sites classified as Jägerleit Stellungen.  There is one other possibility left and that is Adler-Verfahren performed form the GefStd of the Flg.Div., Flg.Füh., Jafü, JG or Jagd Gruppe.  It should be noted that some Stellungen were equipped with the Brummer high power radio transmitter with an effective range of 200 km.  This system was thus mainly intended to facilitate the control of day fighters, since no height finder information was available for nightfighter control beyond the 80 km effective range of the Würzburg-Riese.

In April 2012 I then obtained information supporting the above theory.  On a drawing of DFMZ Stavanger two Seeburg Tische and a Klotsche Tisch were depicted in separate, but adjacent rooms.  The Klotsche Tisch was used to plot allied aircraft in a very large area, and the Seeburg Tisch was used to plot own fighters based on the telling from a Y-Linien.  The information from these tables could then be compiled on a vertical plotting board situated between the two plotting rooms, thus making Y-Verfahren (Jagd) possible.

  The Tirpitz.  



Seen in relation the failure of German fighters to intercept the force sinking the Tirpitz, it is noteworthy, that there was no Jafü/Stellung in the Bardufoss area, which was able to perform intercept control.  This just adds another facet to the otherwise complicated story of this event.

  A Lancaster modified to carry the Tallboy employed during the attack on Tirpitz.  © Kjetil Aakra with his kind permission.  
  Battleship Tirpitz.  
  A Kriegsmarine perspective.  
  The Brummer Stelle NW of Lista airfield consisting of a barrack and two masts.  Not the best map in the world, but the first I have ever seen.  
  Funkaufklärungs Dienst in Norway.